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1  Introduction 
Momentous changes are going on in Europe. Immigrants are arriving in 
unprecedented numbers, and they are re-shaping the structures and composition of 
European populations. Migration tilts the balance between population growth and 
decline, and moderates population ageing. Gross domestic product is accordingly 
expanded, although the effect upon individual standards of living remains 
controversial. The regional distribution of numbers has been changed and the 
growth of some major cities revived. Populations are becoming much more 
diversified in their languages, ethnic groups and religion. Eventually, if recent 
trends continue, the self-identity and even the physical appearance of Europe’s 
people will be changed. Migration is not irreversible. But as far as projected 
changes take place, their effect will be irrevocable. That would be a globalisation 
more complete, although highly asymmetrical, than any analogous process 
affecting the economy or communications.  
  All this presents European countries with major policy dilemmas. For the 
most part, public opinion is opposed to high levels of immigration and the 
changes in the character of neighbourhoods driven by it. But many employers, 
and consumers of services, clamour for immigrant labour. In countries with 
chronically low birth rates, additionally handicapped by a European social model 
of early and generous pay-as-you-go retirement, tight labour market control and 
high youth unemployment, the growing gap between available domestic labour 
and workforce needs is only too obvious.  
  Accordingly the literature on immigration and its effects has hugely 
expanded, with many specialist journals now devoted to the subject. This 
Yearbook, devoted to the effects of migration on demographic change and 
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population composition in Europe, has its origins in a conference in Vienna in 
December 2008, held under the auspices of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. 
About half the contributions to this volume were presented there. Dalkhat Ediev, 
of the Vienna Institute of Demography, and David Coleman, of the University of 
Oxford, have acted as guest editors. The papers in the Yearbook cannot hope to 
cover all aspects of migration and its effects. Nonetheless they offer new insights 
and new data on a variety of effects and processes: the impact of the 2008/2009 
recession on flows; how the fertility of immigrants responds in a new 
environment; the effects of migration on economy and workforce; new reviews on 
its effects upon population ageing; and new light on how immigration, 
concentrated into certain parts of receiving countries, is expanding their regional 
disparities.  
  Some topics are a constant theme in many of the papers without being the 
particular topic of any. They will be discussed here briefly. One is the weakness 
of data on migration stocks and flows. Data are always a problem in demography 
but data on migration, and on foreign-origin populations, are the worst. Little 
wonder that most demographers don’t do migration. 
 
 
2  A difficult and unattractive subject? 
Migration itself is a fuzzy category: unlike birth and death ill defined, repeatable, 
reversible and in the case of illegal immigrants, invisible. It is a complex and 
multiple process: many different kinds of people moving from many origins to 
any given country, for different and often unrelated purposes, for different 
durations of stay and varied probabilities of remaining or returning. The 
economics and history of earlier migration patterns, climate and the politics and 
policies of the sending countries and of the receiving country, all help to 
determine the aggregate gross and net flows. Theory is accordingly fragmented 
and unsatisfactory. Projecting migration is so difficult that most national 
statistical offices simply assume a linear continuation of recent levels in 
projections of national population totals. Migration ‘flows’ are in any case seldom 
measured as such; few countries actually measure movements of persons across 
their border. Most rely on annual changes in registers of population or of foreign 
residents, or the residue between successive population estimates and natural 
change (Salt et al. 1994). While improving in the EU (Poulain et al. 2006), 
statistics generally remain poor and difficult to combine and compare; too often 
defined not by demographic principles but by 57 varieties of national laws and 
regulations (Lemaître 2005; United Nations 2006). Similar problems beset the 
measurement of foreign, immigrant or foreign origin population ‘stocks’. The 
invisible illegal immigrants; the dark matter of migration statistics, are the most 
serious problem in many countries, measurable only imperfectly and indirectly David Coleman  3 
(Clarke 2000; Salt 2000). Their recognition through amnesties can radically alter 
the statistical picture of national population, as in Spain.  
  Better measured is the contrast between the number of resident immigrants 
from foreign countries, most on arrival foreign citizens, and the number of 
resident foreign citizens, most of whom are immigrants. For years most standard 
European statistics have been citing the latter (of uncertain demographic interest) 
and treating them as the former. That practice has become grossly misleading. 
Naturalisation has been pursued energetically as a means of integration, rather 
than as a reward for it, by many countries. By making immigrants disappear 
statistically, that practice turns actual major migration inflows into apparent 
outflows, halving or more the apparent numbers of people of foreign origin living 
in many European countries (see Dumont and Lemaître 2005). These difficulties 
are apparent in a number of the papers presented here, but those papers also show 
new possibilities for analysis of the demographic characteristics of immigrant 
populations using administrative data and comprehensive microcensuses. 
 
 
3  Migration paramount 
It is instructive to put recent inflows to Europe in the broader long-term context of 
the history of the expansion and contraction of Europe in the world. The 
European 19th and 20th century demographic transition, and its transient 
population growth, has been replaced by the 20th and 21st century demographic 
transition in the third world, whose temporary demographic surplus provides the 
raw material of today’s immigration to Europe. That marks a major turning point 
in European history and development.  
  From the 16th to the early 20th centuries, Europeans pushed out westward and 
eastward, in the Americas and Siberia, occupying the lands of others and 
transforming their economy, culture, language, demography and, often, ethnic 
composition. In many cases, the European newcomers substantially or almost 
wholly replaced the indigenous populations. Then, European emigration changed 
the face of other continents and moderated population growth at home, as 54 
million crossed the Atlantic in the long 19th century. Now all that is over. Europe 
is on the road to demographic eclipse in the world at large as it will fall from 22% 
in 1950 to 7% of global population by 2050, and possibly to demographic eclipse 
at home as well. The European political, economic and military dominance that 
lasted from the 18th to the 20th century is clearly finished; and its old identity 
now open to question. Europe cannot avoid being numerically marginalised by 
developing countries only part way through their own demographic transition, 
whose much higher rates of natural increase have left a much more powerful 
momentum behind them. Like Europe a century ago, they now have population to 
spare, and it is coming here. With almost universally sub-replacement fertility, 
and with its demographic momentum almost wound down, the fading natural Introduction: Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe  4 
increase of recent years is tipping into natural decline in many European 
countries, notably in the South and, more abruptly, in the East. 
  Meanwhile immigration, especially from countries outside Europe with 
vigorous natural increase, proceeds at a rapid pace. Today it is those areas, still 
only partly through their fertility transition and with growth further propelled by 
youthful age-structures, that send populations abroad; 60 million from the 
developing countries lived in the developed world in 2007 (United Nations 2005). 
Both the EU-15 countries and the United States receive over one million 
immigrants per year, the numbers generally trending upwards. In 2006, the gross 
inflow into all the EU-27 countries was 3 million, of which 60% was from 
non-EU countries, a quarter each from the rest of Europe, the Americas, Asia and 
Africa (Eurostat news release, 18 November 2008). However since the onset of 
the economic crisis, some inflows have fallen sharply, as the statistics presented 
in the “Data and Trends” section by Tomáš Sobotka show. 
  For obvious reasons migration has tended to increase in the modern world. 
Economic disparities, demographic pressures, political oppression, Europe’s 
welcoming human rights culture, the self-perpetuating chain migration arising 
from kin and family contacts with the traditional societies of non-European 
sending countries—the ‘cumulative causation’ of Massey and Zenteno (1999)—
all facilitate inflow and make it difficult for democracies to control entry. Those 
factors are likely to be here to stay for most of the rest of the century. Some 
regard this inflow as a natural and necessary consequence of Europe’s low 
growth; sucking in population from a world reservoir of abundant non-European 
sources. Such hydraulic analogies, as though the population dynamics of Europe 
could be likened to the operation of a lavatory cistern, should be resisted. Let us 
not forget that immigration can go down as well as up: it can be reversed, by 
economic and political change at home and abroad, and—with difficulty—by 
deliberate policy changes. Recent examples include Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, and the retreat, probably transient, of migration following the 2008-9 
economic crisis.  
  In most European countries today, net international migration exceeds natural 
increase, and the latter includes births to existing immigrants. Births to immigrant 
mothers comprise one in four or more of births in the UK, France, Germany and 
other countries. In the UK and most of Scandinavia, immigration is driving up 
population growth to levels not seen for decades and it is also an important driver 
of growth in the US, Canada and Australia. In central and eastern Europe, the 
effects of very low birth rates and high mortality still predominate. Where natural 
increase has ceased (e.g. Germany, Greece, Italy, Russian Federation), net 
immigration has prevented, or slowed, population decline (Salt 2005; OECD 
2007). In the least demographically favoured countries, (e.g. Bulgaria) net 
emigration compounds a serious level of natural decline. 
  On the most recent (2008) Eurostat projections, some northern European 
countries are projected to increase by between 15% and 26% by mid-century, David Coleman  5 
primarily or entirely, through international migration (Ireland, Norway, UK, 
Sweden, France, and in southern Europe, Spain). These increases contrast with 
the almost stationary future numbers that were projected for those countries in the 
1980s, before the renewed rise of international migration. The western and 
southern countries are all projected to decline substantially without migration, and 
Germany even with it (Figure 1). Some of the more prosperous central European 
countries, for example the Czech Republic and Slovenia, have attracted 
immigration at a level able to moderate what would otherwise be a large projected 
decline in numbers. In most of the others, emigration (mostly to the West) and 
immigration (mostly from the East and South) are more or less balanced, so the 
imagined absence of all migration would make little difference to projected 
population size. On these assumptions, countries such as Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria 
and Romania are expected to lose between 15% and 27% of their population by 
2055, with migration or without it, thanks to their low birth rates. 
  Spain provides us with the most revolutionary example of the effect of 
migration. Until the early 2000s, Spain’s population seemed fated to be driven 
into substantial decline by its then lowest-low fertility, despite some immigration. 
But much immigration was not recorded. Once the illegally-resident population 
was given amnesty by a new government, and migration estimates revised to 
recognise their real scale, the demographic outlook was transformed. Eurostat 
projects a Spanish population of 52.7 million by 2055 from today’s 45.3, a 14 
million addition and 37% greater than projected without migration (38.6 million). 
 
Figure 1: 
Effect of projected levels of international migration on per cent population change, 
















































































































Source: Eurostat 2008 Introduction: Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe  6 
  Of course, migration is volatile. None of these projections will come to pass 
in detail. The 2008 financial and economic crisis will surely affect it. Formal 
labour migration of high-skilled, high-income workers is likely to be most 
reduced, but that is only a minor part of many flows. Betterment migration of 
very poor people from impoverished African and eastern European populations is 
unlikely to be affected, and there is little reason to expect any reduction in the 
inflow of dependants and old, and new, spouses, or of asylum seekers.  
 
 
4  Effects upon the ethnic composition of the population  
All that is familiar enough. Another important consequence is the growth of 
populations of foreign origin, European and especially non-European, to 
proportions never seen before. The growth of non-European populations in 
particular has introduced novel cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. Among 
many minority groups, perceptions of separate identity have persisted beyond the 
immigrant generation, along with residential segregation and difficulties with 
education and integration into the workforce (OECD 2003, 2008) for example, 
Turks in Germany (Liebig 2007). In coping with this, receiving societies face 
challenges in politics and the constitution, education, community relations, trust 
and solidarity. Reconciling differences in expectations and values is complicated 
given that the often robust traditions of the newcomers have arrived at the same 
time as European values (for example with respect to sexual equality) have 
themselves developed rapidly, while traditional notions of national identity and 
religious faith have weakened and declined, for reasons unconnected with 
immigration.  
  In view of all this, some national statistical offices have made projections to 
estimate the likely future size and distribution of ‘foreign origin’ or ‘foreign 
background’ populations (immigrants themselves, and persons born locally but 
with one, or both, parents born abroad). These are summarised elsewhere 
(Coleman 2006). Major populations defined by national origin are projected 
separately, and also clustered into larger ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ groups 
(meaning ‘developed country’ and ‘developing country’, or high and low Human 
Development Index) to reflect broad-brush differences. Between one-third and 
one-half of the foreign-origin populations in European countries around 2000 
were themselves of European origin. In general, projected increases are 
concentrated in the ‘non-western’ group.  
  These projections typically incorporate an assumption about the shorter-term 
persistence of ethnic demographic characteristics, and a longer-term assumption 
about assimilation. After the second generation, however, all persons of 
immigrant descent are assumed to become part of the indigenous population, and 
to be henceforth Dutch, Danish etc., and therefore statistically invisible. That David Coleman  7 
assumption, which means that without further immigration everyone would 
eventually indeed be Dutch, Danish etc, may be a little optimistic.  
  Continued growth of those populations has inevitably led to a diminution of 
the share of the white population in the national total, bringing with it suggestions 
of the long-term prospect of its displacement as the majority. That outcome is 
projected to occur in 2043 in the United States in respect of the white non-
Hispanic population, according to the US C e n s u s  B u r e a u  ( 2 0 0 8 ) .  I t  i s  s i m p l e  
demography that any population with sub-replacement fertility, with a regular net 
inflow of population of foreign origin, must diminish as a proportion of the total, 
and eventually be replaced by that immigrant-origin population (except for 
persons of mixed ancestry, who are likely to become numerous). Almost all 
western countries have sub-replacement TFR and positive immigration and 
therefore face that outcome unless birth or migration rates change. With 
replacement fertility, the indigenous population will persist, but continued 
migration will diminish its share of the total. 
  Around the year 2000 in western Europe foreign-origin populations 
comprised between 8%-18% of total population. They are projected to reach 
20%-30% in 2050 given the continuation of recent migration inflows, and 
considerably higher proportions in younger cohorts and in urban areas. These 
projections all deliver a similar message. From different starting levels, the rate of 
growth of the foreign-origin population is linear with a similar slope in different 
countries, despite varied source countries of origin. Despite the automatic 
dissipation of the foreign-origin population after two generations according to the 
assumptions of the projections, linear growth continues unchanged up to the end 
of the projection period. 
  Equivalent projections for other European populations have not been 
published. However, data on births suggest that similar processes are in train 
throughout western Europe (see Ediev et al. 2007). In France, for example, 23% 
of births were to foreign women in 2006, and in Germany 25%, approximately 
equivalent to the 24% of births to immigrant women in England and Wales in 
2006. In countries of more recent immigration, however, the proportions are 
lower: 11.5% in Italy in 2007, for example. But the pace is hotting up: in most of 
Europe except the East, annual contributions to the population from foreign 
immigration are approaching the annual contribution from all births. In 2007, net 
immigration to Spain of 702,000 exceeded the total number of births by 44%. In 
eight other European countries, net immigration was at least half the number of 
annual live births (from 50% in Sweden to 93% in Switzerland; Table 1). Overall, 
the weighted average for western Europe was 44%. Recently the Netherlands had 
been in the unusual position of emigration exceeding immigration in 2004-2007, 
partly because of an outflow of Dutch citizens unmatched since the emigration 
heyday of the 1950s (van Dalen 2007). A number of central and eastern European 
populations are in a similar position, emigration being about the same magnitude 
as immigration. As many of those leaving are citizens and many of those entering Introduction: Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe  8 
are not, population turnover continues (including in the Netherlands) despite 
negligible migration flows in net terms. 
 
 
5  The faces of the future? 
So far, groups have been discussed as being of one ethnic or foreign-origin group 
or another, as official statistics present them. Natural human inclinations are 
beginning to erode that neat picture. They may end up, in the very long run, 
destroying it altogether. That is because, as minority populations grow, and 
especially insofar as they become more integrated into the educational system and 
the labour market, the opportunities for friendship, love and sexual union across 
ethnic or racial lines are likely to become more numerous. Although some 
minority groups are very self-contained, strongly preferring arranged marriages 
and hostile to out-marriage, in general, more and more children are born with 
mixed parentage as time goes on. Those children may identify, or be identified, as 
members of either parental group, or neither. When given the chance, many are 
content, or even anxious, to describe themselves as of mixed or multiple ancestry, 
at least as far as the US and UK evidence shows. Data on these developments are 
more advanced in the English speaking world where self-ascribed ethnic or racial 
categories are employed: register-based official categories have no concept of 
mixed citizenship. Furthermore the consequent expansion of ‘diversity’ fits the 
‘multicultural’ policies prevalent in the English-speaking world; Continental 
emphasis on ‘citizenship’ encourages more binary assumptions. It also follows 
that statistics on marriages of persons of local citizens with foreign citizens, 
readily found in official Continental publications, may in fact mean little. Many 
of the partners will belong to the same origin, except that one partner is 
naturalised, the other not. 
  In the past, mixed unions usually incurred social obloquy or even legal 
sanction, often conducted in private both by the good and great and by the 
humble, from Jefferson downwards, and the children marginalised (with some 
pleasing exceptions, notably Dumas and Pushkin). People of mixed origin have 
now emerged from social obscurity into global prominence. The eminent 
geneticist Professor Steve Jones has described this as the face of the future, 
claiming that ‘the future is brown’ (Times 7 October 2008). If so, it is a long way 
off and some groups will quickly become browner (or paler) than others. For 
example, the 2001 Census of England and Wales revealed that a proportion of the 
population claiming some Caribbean background were in fact of mixed origin. 
71% of the births to Caribbean mothers were described as Caribbean, 18% as 
mixed. The latter are lost statistically to the ‘Black Caribbean’ population, which 
was to that extent diminished in number. The White population gains some of that 
population, because through self-ascription some of the offspring of the 
subsequent mixed group may be labelled (by their parents) as being ‘white’. To David Coleman  9 
take another example, at the 2001 census, 55% of the children of Chinese mothers 




Selected western countries. Comparisons of live births, net immigration and natural 
increase around 2008 (in thousands) 
  Population  





as per cent of 
births 
Spain  44,475 488 107 702  144 
Switzerland  7,509 74 13 69  93 
Italy  59,131 563  -7 494  88 
Norway  4,681 58 17 40  68 
Belgium  10,585  121 20 62  52 
Austria  8,299 76  2 31  41 
Greece  11,172 110  2  41  37 
Denmark  5,447 64  8 20  32 
United Kingdom  60,817 771 195 175  23 
France   61,538 784 268  70  9 
Germany  82,315 683  -141  48  7 
11 country total  355,968 3,792  483 1,752  46 
Australia  21,015 285 145 213  75 
Canada  33,311 357 127 204  57 
New Zealand  4,263 64 35  4  11 
United States  304,060 4,329 1,881  889  21 
Sources: Websites of Eurostat, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Canada, Statistics New Zealand, US 
Census Bureau. 
Note: US data refer to refer to the period between July 1, 2007 and July 1, 2008; data for Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand refer to 2007.  
 
 
6  The contributions to the Yearbook 
The papers presented in this volume have not concentrated on such topics 
although they are alluded to not infrequently. The contributions have been 
grouped into three loose categories. First and most topical, a paper by Beets and 
Willekens on the process of migration itself; discussing the extent to which the 
current economic crisis may or may not change the pattern and volume of 
immigration into Europe. Papers by Schmid and Kohls, and by Mussino, 
Iaccarino, Prati and Strozza, address the demographic behaviour of immigrants 
and their descendants in the receiving country, exploring the extent to which they 
do, or do not, adapt fertility and other behaviour to new surroundings. Four papers 
address the demographic and economic consequences of mass migration. The first 
two, by Gil Alonso and by Ivanov, concentrate on the current and projected 
labour market and on population structure. Among other issues they consider Introduction: Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe  10 
whether immigration, or non-demographic adaptations, can adequately 
compensate for the demographic and economic difficulties arising from 
population ageing. The next two of these papers, by Golini and Bartolomeo, and 
by Kostaki, Kotzaminis and Agorastakis, concentrate on the differential regional 
demographic and economic effects of the migration, which is far from 
geographically uniform. In the last paper, a more theoretical contribution by Inaba 
develops a model widely used in epidemiology to analyse more exactly that kind 
of sub-national demographic change in a multiregional analytical framework. 
Finally, to complement these analyses and to provide a source of reference, 
Sobotka has provided a substantial, comprehensive review of European migration 
trends, supported by numerous up-to-date detailed tables and graphs. Brief 
descriptions of these papers follow below. 
In The global economic crisis and international migration: An uncertain outlook 
Gijs Beets and Frans Willekens begin on a highly contemporary note, discussing 
the migratory consequences of the financial crisis of 2008, which spread from the 
United States of America to much of the rest of the world. They show how 
international migration theory, data on the effect of past financial crises on 
international migration, and expert opinion and discussion on the Internet 
(published accounts of empirical evidence are still rare) can guide us to a 
preliminary view of the consequences. Three theoretical perspectives are used to 
explore the likely responses to recession: 1) migration as an option in the life 
course of individuals and households; 2) the effect of social networks and social 
capital; and 3) macro-economic analysis of migration as an adjustment 
mechanism in the labour market. All these are connected: individuals have 
preferences but social networks and economic, political and other conditions 
change behaviour.  
The authors conclude that of all types of migration, labour migration will be 
affected most, while political and environmental refugees, marriage migration and 
family reunion will not be much affected. Of existing resident migrants, those 
employed in sectors that are most stricken by the financial crisis and the recession 
are more likely to lose their jobs than migrants employed in other sectors of the 
economy. That means that low-skilled immigrants will be most affected by the 
worsening of the labour market conditions because they tend to be concentrated in 
industries which are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations (for example 
construction and parts of the service sector) and because they have less secure 
contractual arrangements in their jobs. However, if migrants have invested 
heavily in migration and settlement in the country of destination then they are 
unlikely to return to their country of origin, although remittances home are likely 
to fall. Inflows may also be restricted by new policies if anti-immigration 
sentiments increase which may result in restrictive immigration policies. These 
conclusions, echoed by others (e.g. Dobson et al. 2009) underline the various 
positive pressures behind current migration streams, and the inadequacy of 
economic models and economic considerations to account for major movements David Coleman  11 
in international migration. That is not surprising, given that (despite the 
assumptions of economists) most legal international migration to Europe in recent 
decades has not been ostensibly for purposes of work, even though those who 
migrate for other reasons may work after arrival. An example from the inflows to 
France in 2005 is given below (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: 
France 2005. Immigration (gross flow) by group of nationalities according to reason 
for admission (per cent) 




































































































































All EEA  100 7.7  2.6 33.9 5.7 3.8 0.0 45.5 0.0 0.9 42,876 20.7 
Turkey, Switzerland  100  11.9  14.9 10.7 15.1 24.2 2.7 2.2 17.7 0.6 24,404  11.8 
Africa 100  8.2  16.7 1.4 16.8 41.1 3.9 5.3 4.5 2.0 95,309  45.9 
Asia 100  5.4  45.7 6.2 10.3 13.5 5.9 1.7 10.0 1.4 29,274  14.1 
Americas 100  6.3  39.8 8.7 8.6 20.1 12.0 1.5 2.2 0.8 14,941  7.2 
Other countries  100 4.7  27.6 17.5 12.5 13.0 15.5 2.1 6.2 1.1 756  0.4 
Total non-Europe  100 8.1  23.7 4.4 14.6 31.6 4.9 3.9 7.2 1.6 164,685 79.3 
Grand total  100  8.0  19.4 10.5 12.8 25.9 3.9 12.5 5.7 1.4 207,561  100.0 
Source: INED statistiques sur les flux d’immigration 
(http://statistiques_flux_immigration.site.ined.fr/fr/admissions) 
Note: EEA refers to the European Economic Area (all the EU countries, Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway). 
 
 
Reproductive behaviour of migrant women in Germany: Data, patterns and 
determinants, by Susanne Schmid and Martin Kohls. 
Schmid and Kohls examine the influence of migration on fertility among migrant 
women in Germany. They review the major hypotheses on migrant fertility as a 
preliminary to a multivariate analysis of the patterns observed in the data. Their 
overview of the datasets is a valuable update on the varied sources now available 
for the study of the demographic characteristics of foreign citizens in Germany, 
and the familiar story of their adequacy or (mostly) lack of it. These range from 
official vital registration data (limited to data defined by nationality), the official 
Microcensus, administrative sources, and other panels and surveys including the 
international Generations and Gender Survey. While the administrative sources 
are of little use, the Microcensus now permits the construction of a population of 
two-generation ‘foreign background’ of the kind described above, amounting to 
19% of the total population and one in three of those aged under age 5 in 2008, 
compared with 8% with foreign nationality. Among major migrant groups 
analysed, Turkish women show the highest and Polish women the lowest fertility Introduction: Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe  12 
level, as might be expected. The authors use the Sample Survey of Selected 
Migrant Groups in Germany (RAM) to analyse further these fertility differentials. 
They show that mixed couples where the husband is German have lower fertility 
than those of single immigrant origin. The fertility of Muslim women is elevated 
when compared with that of other religious groups. Perhaps surprisingly, 
emotional ties with the country of origin and the level of native and German 
language skills appear to have no influence on migrants’ fertility. Having births in 
the country of origin seems to be a single most important factor positively 
affecting migrants’ completed fertility. 
 
Short term reproductive behaviour of foreign women who became mothers 
between 2002-2006 in Italy, by Eleonora Mussino, Claudia Iaccarino, Sabrina 
Prati and Salvatore Strozza. 
While Germany is a country that has experienced major immigrant inflows ever 
since the guest-worker period of the 1960s, the rise of immigration to Italy has 
been much more recent although very rapid. Foreigners resident in Italy increased 
from 1.5 million to 3.5 million in seven years. By 2008 there were 4.5 million 
foreign citizens in Italy, over 7% of the total population. In the last six years the 
annual number of births with at least one foreign parent increased from about 
41,000 to more than 86,000, over 11% of all births in 2007. That rapid increase in 
the number of foreigners and in related demographic events has raised public 
interest in the demographic behaviour of immigrants in Italy. The paper presents 
an overview of the demographic characteristics of immigrant mothers in Italy, 
based on the risk of having another child among women who first became 
mothers between 2002-2006. These unusual parity-based data come from a 
longitudinal analysis through record linkage of Italian administrative data on 
births. However, the restricted time-span shows the continued difficulty of 
conducting research on the demography of foreign-origin populations. The results 
show considerable variation in fertility between different national origins. 
Citizenship seems to be one of the most important factors explaining the high 
heterogeneity of the reproductive behaviour between the mothers. As with the 
results of Schmid and Kohls, the fertility of unions with a local (Italian) partner 
tends to be closer to the national norm. Somewhat opposing to the findings for 
Germany, however, the authors conclude that having had a first birth in the 
country of origin reduces migrants’ likelihood of having another child in Italy. 
Given the relatively short observation period, this may, of course, reflect 
disruption or delay of family building because of migration. 
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Demographic and economic factors of labour supply: Long-term projections and 
policy options for France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, by Serguey 
Ivanov. 
Ivanov’s paper presents labour supply scenarios in France, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom for the years 2025 and 2050 and discusses their implications for 
economic growth and welfare, the adequacy of labour supply, and other 
economic/demographic interactions on an unusually broad canvas. The analyses 
are supported by a very extensive supply of data in tables and graphs. The 
projections were based on the major contributing demographic and non-
demographic factors that determine labour supply. These are defined as the 
working-age population, the labour force participation rate, the employment rate, 
and labour utilisation (defined as the number of hours worked per worker per 
year, in which Italy comes out top). The assumptions underlying the scenarios 
varied from plausible, to ‘best case scenario’, to unrealistic.  
  The projections point to very different outcomes for the four populations 
studied, arising from contrasting levels of fertility and immigration, interacting 
with the highly varied social and institutional factors that determine the 
proportion of the population that is economically dependent or economically 
active. In France and in the United Kingdom, relatively high fertility coupled with 
relatively high continuing immigration at the current levels will lead to only a 
marginal decrease of the size of the working-age population, and the scenarios do 
not take into account the recent further rises in fertility in those countries. By 
contrast, the size of Germany’s and Italy’s working-age population will shrink 
significantly by 2025 and, barring a tremendous surge in immigration, greatly by 
mid-century.  
  In order to sustain the supply of labour on current trends, unemployment in 
Italy would have to be reduced greatly, as well as maintaining and increasing the 
recent increase in the labour force participation rate and keeping immigration 
high. But even though Germany has substantial demographic reserves and thus a 
large potential for increasing labour utilisation, unless immigration is increased 
dramatically, the fall in the working-age population will continue to reduce the 
labour supply. To a degree varying between countries, governments can control 
the components of labour supply and capitalise on whatever advantages they may 
possess. But the author points out that lowest-low fertility is deeply entrenched in 
Italy and especially in Germany. Even if it is reversed to some extent—as the 
scenarios assume—reductions in the labour force cannot be avoided. Without 
substantial increases in fertility, and radical labour and immigration reforms, 
labour supply will fall by double-digit percentage points. The half-a-child 
difference in the total fertility rate between France and the United Kingdom on 
the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other, accounts for much of the 
difference in the projected labour market dynamics. The further improvements in 
labour force participation and utilisation, and the greater immigration needed to 
arrest numerical decline in Germany and Italy could promote renewed economic Introduction: Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe  14 
growth if applied in France and the United Kingdom. In more general comments, 
the author discusses the prospect of population decline in objective terms, 
pointing out that it is not all disadvantage. But he emphasises that in conditions of 
declining demography, that the ‘win-win’ possibilities of the past in respect of 
migration from eastern Europe to the West are over, and that in the new zero-sum 
game, further emigration from eastern Europe is likely to have marked 
unfavourable effects on the economies of those sending countries. 
 
Can the rising pension burden in Europe be mitigated by immigration? Modelling 
the effects of selected demographic and socio-economic factors on ageing in the 
European Union, 2008-2050, by Fernando Gil Alonso. 
Continuing and developing the theme of the previous paper, Gil Alonso reviews 
population ageing—defined here as the increase in the numbers of retired 
people—as one of the main challenges which European societies must face. He 
emphasises that this challenge cannot just be reduced to the demographic factor, 
but that the latter is nonetheless crucial. However, the construction of highly 
sophisticated models to analyse the social and economic impact of ageing 
encounters problems of data availability and comparability between EU Member 
States. In order to overcome those difficulties, a different approach is used in this 
paper. A demography-based model (inspired by the work of Calot) using 
simplified assumptions, has been produced and presented here to assess the 
implications of ageing for the 27 EU countries over the period 2008-2050, and the 
relative impact of a series of alternative measures that could be implemented to 
counteract ageing. The analysis deploys abundant data including some valuable 
information on the effective retirement age—as opposed to official pensionable 
age—in various European countries. Analysis focuses on labour supply growth 
through foreign immigration from outside the European Union. But the paper also 
analyses the effectiveness of other responses, such as increasing the retirement 
age and improvements in the rate of employment of the population of working 
age. 
  Results confirm the conclusion reached by other studies that immigration by 
itself cannot counteract ageing in the European Union, as the large and 
necessarily increasing number of immigrants needed to compensate for the 
increasing number of retired people—160 million immigrants by mid-century—
would be so high that no country could assume the social and political costs of 
such a process. Immigration can, however, play a complementary role if it is 
combined with other measures contributing both to increase labour participation 
and delay retirement. The author emphasises that a diversity of responses is 
needed in response to the very different circumstances and characteristics of the 
countries concerned; no one ‘European’ size will fit all. The policy mix should be 
different in each EU Member State, argues Gil Alonso, depending on the initial 
value of each variable of the model. 
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The impact of massive migration flow on regional population structure: The case 
of Italy, by Antonio Golini and Anna Di Bartolomeo.  
A low rate of economic growth is a common problem in many European 
countries. Here, the authors highlight the role of demographic factors, in 
particular international migration, in supporting the growth of gross domestic 
product, particularly through its effects upon the age structure dynamics. Using 
the Italian example, they show the conditions required to ensure that immigration 
progresses from a potential to an actual resource for economic welfare.  
  The authors come to generally favourable conclusions concerning the effect of 
large-scale migration on the economy of Italy, but express some concerns about 
regional imbalances and difficulties of integration. Immigration has an immediate 
effect on national income by increasing the labour force and the participation rate. 
Demographically speaking, it helps to maintain population size, the working-age 
population ratio and, thereby, GDP. In particular, migration tends to become 
necessary to avoid holes in the age pyramid and the corresponding falls in the 
active population. Taking a pessimistic view on the future of Italian fertility, and 
recognising that migrants also age, it is assumed that the inflow of immigrants 
must at least be maintained, or gradually increased, to counteract the perpetual 
decline and ageing of the Italian population itself and of earlier immigrants. 
Policy therefore must encourage growing immigration flows. That obviously 
underlines the need for effective integration policies not only for social reasons 
but also because immigrants need to be integrated in order to bring them up to the 
same productivity of the natives. However, nothing is said about what those high 
and increasing levels of immigration will do to Italian identity, or how Italians 
might react to an increasingly non-Italian society.  
  The authors’ findings also throw new light on the role of immigration in the 
current policy debate on Italian federalism. They fear that immigration, 
concentrated in the North, may exacerbate the economic and structural 
inequalities between North and South, possibly creating a poverty trap for the 
southern regions. The higher fertility that used to give the South a demographic 
advantage has now disappeared, fertility levels being convergent, while southern 
population size and structure is not much reinforced by immigration. Assuming 
no resolution of the fertility problem, the authors argue that policies must 
recognise this problem in order to ensure that migration remains an economic 
resource and does not become a problem to solve. 
 
Effects of immigration on population growth and structures in Greece – A spatial 
approach, by Anastasia Kostaki, Byron Kotzaminis and Michail Agorastakis. 
Greece, like Italy, is a country which until relatively recently saw its own citizens 
leaving for other countries, by contrast with the large-scale immigration of 
foreigners that started only in the early 1990s. The transformation has been 
relatively sudden and is still developing fast. The number of foreigners in Greece 
has increased from under 200,000 in 1981 to over three quarters of a million in Introduction: Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe  16 
2001; from 2% to 7% of the population. These immigration flows comprise 
various nationality groups with different demographic profiles and structures. 
This heterogeneity is compounded by a highly differentiated pattern of settlement 
of various immigrant groups in different parts of Greece.  
  Using a rich supply of data, the authors analyse the quantitative effects and 
the implications of immigration on the population size and structure at an 
unusually detailed geographical level, according to the nationality composition of 
the foreign population, so as to detect structures otherwise invisible. This is done 
through data on the population size and the age and sex structure of the native and 
foreign populations in the 995 Greek municipalities, using four categories of 
foreign citizens: from developed countries, from the Balkans, from the former 
communist eastern European countries and from the less developed world. 
Statistical clustering techniques have been utilised in order to define 
homogeneous groups of municipalities according to the nationality composition 
of their foreign population and the severity of immigration impact on the size and 
on the demographic characteristics of the population in Greek municipalities. 
  Their analysis shows that the massive inflow of foreigners in Greece has made 
significant changes in the demographic map of the country; highly differentiated 
according to nationality and demographic characteristics. It emphasises the need, 
given the highly heterogeneous nature and geographical distribution of foreign 
inflows, to analyse such migration at a small spatial scale in order to develop 
effective, differentiated policies for dealing with it.  
 
The net reproduction rate and the type-reproduction number in multiregional 
demography, by Hisashi Inaba. 
This paper provides a natural and more technical adjunct to the regional and local-
based analysis described in the preceding two papers. In supplying a 
mathematical model that incorporates the migration process in the demographic 
development of linked sub-populations, it is a contribution of general applicability 
relevant to a variety of demographic and national circumstances, not limited by 
specific conditions of time or space, and should be of enduring and general 
interest. The author shows that in order to study the effects of migration on the 
demographic changes of populations subdivided into several regions, it is 
necessary to use the theoretical framework of multistate demography. Although 
multistate demography has been explored since the beginning of 1970s, its key 
concept, the multistate net reproduction rate, has long been neglected. The review 
focuses on multiregional stable population systems and elaborates the definition 
of the multiregional net reproduction rate. The paper borrows from mathematical 
epidemiology the concept of the type-reproduction number ‘T’ (sometimes called 
the ‘state-reproduction number’) in order to develop the missing multiregional net 
reproduction rate, which integrates the diverse reproductive power of all the sub-
components of the system.  David Coleman  17 
  In epidemiology, the net reproduction rate of a disease organism infecting a 
particular host (denoted ‘R0’ in epidemiological usage, not ‘NRR’) is the key 
variable in determining its spread and the possibilities of its control. When more 
than one form of the same host co-exist in a population, with different levels of 
susceptibility which affect the reproductive characteristics of the infective agent, a 
single R0 becomes inappropriate. The parallel is, of course, the inability of one 
NRR to reflect the reproductive characteristics of the different elements of a 
multiregional population system linked by migration. The type-reproduction 
number takes this heterogeneity into account. When only one type exists, T = R0. 
The author shows that it becomes a useful index to formulate a simple control 
relation for multiregional population. 
  The type-reproduction number cannot be defined if the reproduction rate of 
the multiregional system is greater than one. But in many developed countries not 
only is national fertility below replacement level but so are all the regional or sub-
national fertility rates as well. In that case, the type-reproduction number for each 
region can be computed. The level of the national (or multinational) fertility can 
rise above replacement level if the level of reproduction in some of the regions 
increases substantially, as opposed to every regional level of fertility increasing 
uniformly (that could be an important consideration in the development of 
population policies designed to counteract population ageing by encouraging 
higher national levels of reproduction). The type-reproduction number gives a 
useful index to formulate the critical fertility level of individuals at specific target 
states to which population control policy will be applied. With this approach it is 
also possible to calculate other demographic indices, including the generation 
length, the intrinsic growth rate and the momentum of population growth, all 
important in understanding the effect of the heterogeneous individual behaviour 
of regions in a system upon the dynamics of the whole population. The type-
reproduction number is an example of recent rapid epidemiological developments 
of reproduction rate theory originally borrowed from demography. Now it should 
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